Programme Aid Evaluation: by Eeckhout, Marion et al.
I Introduction
Over time, programme aid has gained importance in
Dutch development cooperation, as well as in that of
other donor countries. Arguments for an increased
focus on programme aid were disappointing results of
project aid, limited absorption capacity of recipients
of the latter form of aid, improved capability of gov-
ernments eligible for programme aid to deal with aid
according to their own objectives, and ease and flexi-
bility of disbursement for the Dutch administration.
Therefore, increasingly the need arose to evaluate the
effects of programme aid, the efficiency of its admin-
istration, and its relation to the overall policy objec-
tives of Dutch development cooperation, visually
economic self-reliance, poverty alleviation, women's
emancipation and environmental protection.
The Dutch government carried out three bilateral
evaluation studies of programme aid in the period
1988-1994 and participated in multi-donor Joint
Evaluation Missions (JEMs) under auspices of the
World Bank. The general purpose of JEMs was to
examine possibilities of harmonization of pracurement
and disbursement procedures of programme aid.
Evaluation of direct macro-effectiveness of pro-
gramme aid did not take place in any of the recent
Dutch evaluation studies. Instead, the emphasis
was on the efficiency of aid delivery. It is therefore
impossible to speak of a methodology followed by
the Dutch government in evaluations of macro-
effectiveness of programme aid. Direct effectiveness
of programme aid could only be established at the
micro and meso level. JEMs focused on the institu-
tional and operational aspects of programme aid.
With the introduction of Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs), the objectives of programme
aid shifted from supplying commodity import sup-
port under foreign exchange constraints to the
objectives related to policy-based lending. Appraisal
criteria for providing programme aid were modified
accordingly, but evaluation criteria did not change.
SAP-related criteria should have been incorporated
in evaluation of the effectiveness of programme aid
given in the more recent period. These are, in short,
the effects of programme aid on the main macro-
economic variables and the contributions of pro-
gramme aid to the building of economic institutions
required for the market economy With further
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progress in the process of establishing market insti-
tutions, programme aid aimed at reducing balance
of payments deficits could be slowly reduced.
However, programme aid for policy support may
continue, freeing funds that can be more directly tar-
geted to achieve the overall objectives of Dutch aid.
lt will be argued that an institutional approach to
programme aid evaluation should be followed, in
addition to quantitative evaluation of macro-effec-
tiveness of programme aid. It will also be argued
that an appropriate multi-donor forum should be
sought that addresses both the economic and insU-
tutïonal aspects of programme aid.
The remainder of this article is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes the main aspects of Dutch
programme aid and recent evaluations. In Section 3
it is argued that more clarity should be obtained on
what should be evaluated in a wider context of
structural adjustment policies. Section 4 describes
the issues dealt with in Joint Evaluation Missions.
The final section concludes.
2 Dutch Policy and Evaluation of
Programme Aid
Dutch programme aid amounted to Dfl. 514 million in
1994, or 8 per cent of total aid disbursements
(DVIJOS 1995).' The Dutch 'Guidelines on Pro-
gramme Aid' distinguish two broad categories
(Eeckhout 1994:9-22): macro-oriented programme
aid, covering balance of payments (BOP) support and
other forms of foreign exchange support (i.e. forex
auctions and forex bureaus), general import support,
co-financing structural adjustment loans and different
forms of debt relief; and meso-oriented programme
aid, consisting of sectoral import support; food aid and
emergency aid (except temporary emergency aid), co-
financing of sectoral adjustment loans, financial sector
adjustment loans, support to social safety nets, sectoral
budget support and debt-swaps or debt conversion.
Of the total amount in 1994, 38 per cent was non-
sectoral programme aid (194 mIn.), 46 per cent
debt relief (235 mln.), and the remaining 16 per
cent sectoral programme aid, including so-called
'structural' food aid and emergency aid.
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2.1 Dutch Policy on Programme Aid
The objective of providing programme aid has
changed since the early 1990s, from alleviating acute
BOF problems to supporting general economic and
social policy within a structural reform programme.
Policy agreements on the reform programme have
become more important than the specific macroeco-
nomic effects of programme aid (Eeckhout 1994:3).
Guidelines for the appraisal of programme aid focus
on the following aspects (DVLJOS 1991:298): (a)
the recipient country's macro-socioeconomic policy;
(b) its institutional capacities; (c) the extent of desir-
ability and feasibility of targeting of financial aid;
and (d) the possibility of donor coordination (dur-
ing formulation and implementation).
2.2 Macro Versus Sector, or the
Dilemma of Targeting
The policy intention is to provide as much pro-
gramme aid without 'any strings attached' in the
form of conditionality or targeting (DVLJOS
199 1:298). However, in practice there are a number
of reasons for choosing another instrument than
unconditional macro support. For example, a par-
ticular system is in use in a specific country and has
been approved and tested by the coordinated donor
community Or, more substantially, the reform poi-
icy is making uneven progress and some policy
areas are clearly lagging behind. In that case an
extra incentive can be given by emphasizing sec-
toral import support or sectoral budget support.
2.3 From the Balance of Payments
to the Budget
The reform policies have brought about more liberal
systems of foreign exchange allocation and of import
procedures in general, reducing Dutch and other
donors' concern with the specific use of the foreign
exchange. (Even the World Bank has recently relin-
quished its import support documentation require-
ments). The focus of Dutch programme aid has now
shifted to budget support (DVIJOS 1996). This
involves detailing the mechanism of financing via the
budget and focusing on allocations to social services. It
is recognized that fungibility is a serious risk in budget
According to the 1991 White Paper 'A World of (macro or sectoral) through the balance of payments or
Difference': 'in essence, programme aid amounts to the budget' (DVIJOS 1991:298).
general financial support for a developing country
support. Therefore, light conditionality on sectoral
programmes and gradual takeover of financing by the
recipient country is advocated. The donor community
should avoid the trap of seeking illusory control over
the specific use of countervalue funds in specific pro-
grammes. The impact of the support can be derived
from the (improvement of) the quality of the sector
policy and can be operationalized in monitoring indi-
cators that will be agreed upon beforehand.
2.4 Bilateral Evaluation Studies of
Programme Aid
This section presents the main features of the three
evaluation studies of Dutch programme aid con-
ducted since 1988 and describes the methodologies
adopted. General evaluation criteria derive from the
overall objectives of Dutch development policy of
(a) enhancing economic self-reliance, (b) alleviating
poverty, (c) enhancing women's emancipation, and
(d) protecting the environment. Furthermore, the
effectiveness of aid in reaching its specific objectives
is evaluated and the efficiency of aid delivery is
investigated. The contribution to poverty alleviation
can be demonstrated indirectly at most. According
to the literature it is virtually impossible to demon-
strate a causal link between programme aid and the
incidence and distribution of poverty
In order to determine the effects of programme aid,
a proper evaluation methodology should distin-
guish between the effects on macro, sectoral and
sometimes micro (firm) level. The evaluation
reports will be assessed on the distinction in these
three levels of analysis.
2.5 Evaluation of Commodity
Import Support
The evaluation study of Dutch commodity import
support by the evaluation unit 10V (DGISIIOV
1989) follows a sequence from the micro to the
meso and macro level, with gradually less emphasis
on effectiveness.
Direct effectiveness of programme aid could only be
established at the micro and meso level. At the
micro level the evaluation methodology consists of
an analysis of key features of a sample of enterprises
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that received import support from the Netherlands.
At the sectoral level, information was collected on
magnitude and structure of sectors, their position
within the national economy, economic efficiency,
government policy on prices and subsidies and the
allocation of foreign exchange.
At the macro level, the evaluation consists of an analy-
sis of data concerning: the nature of development of the
recipient country and the role of internal and external
factors therein; major aspects of its economic policies;
the forex situation and the system of forex allocation.
The effectiveness of programme aid at the macro level
was not evaluated systematically, although attempts
were made to incorporate the overall economic policy
stance of particular countries (mostly referring to the
WB/IMF opinion on the quality of reform policies).
However, no independent macroeconomic analysis
was carried out on the influence of programme aid on
the quality of the reform policies. The possible contri-
bution of programme aid to the transformation towards
market based institutions has not been discussed.
2.6 Evaluation of Programme Aid
to Tanzania, India and Mali
More recently, overall bilateral aid to three countries
was evaluated.2 The main evaluation questions con-
cerning programme aid were: (a) to what extent did
import support alleviate bottlenecks in the produc-
tion structure and reduce deficits in the trade bal-
ance? and (b) to what extent did budget support
contribute to poverty alleviation at the local,
regional and/or sectoral level? The first question
conforms with the evaluation study discussed
above, but misses the macro-aspect. The second
elaborates on the (indirect) effectiveness of pro-
gramme aid in alleviating poverty
2.7 Evaluation of Programme Aid
to Eight Major Recipient Countries
In 1993 the Dutch audit office evaluated programme
aid to eight major recipient countries of Dutch pro-
gramme aid: Bangladesh, India, Kenya,
Mozambique, Pakistan, Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe (Algemene Rekenkamer 1994). The eval-
uation took place in cooperation with the National
Audit Office of the UK and the Riksrevtsionsverket
DGIS/IOV (1994b,c,d). For a summary, see
DGIS/IOV(1994a).
(RVV) of Sweden (see also RVV 1994). The two
questions central in the evaluation concerned the
efficiency of programme aid and the knowledge of
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the effec-
tiveness of programme aid (Algemene Rekenkamer
1994:8). Given the main mandate of the Dutch audit
office, the emphasis was on efficiency of aid. In fact,
the audit office evaluated the objectives of pro-
gramme aid, guidelines, procedures, assessment cri-
teria, evaluations, the feedback of evaluations to
policy and aspects of personnel management of
DGIS at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Macro-effectiveness was investigated in a very limited
way and described only in very general terms. The
audit office only investigated whether the various
Dutch agencies and actors were sufficiently informed
about the progress in macro policies. Incidentally, the
evaluation of effectiveness was pursued at the sec-
toral level, in particular with respect to supply of fer-
tilizer. According to the audit office, after 1988 the
micro-level effects of targeted programme aid have
only been evaluated in Tanzania (ibid. 1994:12). lt
concludes that the view of the Ministry on the effec-
tiveness of programme aid is mainly limited to the
effect at the macro level and that the view at the
micro and meso level has to be improved.
2.8 Observations on the
Methodologies Used
The studies of the 10V and Algemene Rekenkamer
have concentrated on the micro and meso level. At
the micro level the evaluation methodology is rela-
tively straightforward and concentrates on the uti-
lization of the additional resources for higher
production, capacity utilization, and productivity
The evaluation of the macroeconomic aspects of
effectiveness of aid instruments has been replaced
by the appraisal of conformity of the policies of the
receiving government with the general Dutch aid
policies and efficiency of aid delivery
Given the admitted lack of understanding of the
causal connection between programme aid and
macroeconomic consequences, the common proce-
dure is to assume that the World Bank and the IMF
know what they are doing and leave the assessment
of the macroeconomic policies, the programme aid,
and their consequences to these institutions. In
Dutch aid circles more information on the macro-
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economic consequences of programme aid has been
requested from the World Bank and IME
Thus, at the macro level no adequate methodology
was developed. The Dutch evaluators are not alone
here. This problem is shared between all donors of
programme aid. The next section will argue that, in
addition to quantitative evaluation of macro effec-
tiveness of programme aid, an institutional
approach should be followed, particularly in the
context of the changing conditions before, during
and after structural adjustment.
3 Programme Aid in the Context
of Structural Adjustment
The objectives of programme aid should be under-
stood in the context of the economic conditions and
policies prevailing in the receiving countries. The
main objective of structural adjustment policies has
been to implement a transition from an administered
economy toward a market-based economy This tran-
sition has affected all main economic parameters of
the countries involved and, more fundamentally
involved changes in their economic institutions. This
section deals with both the institutional and more
direct economic effects of programme aid and dis-
cusses the relation between possïble effects of pro-
gramme aid and Dutch general aid policies.
3.1 Programme Aid and Market-
based Economic Institutions
In most countries that have received programme aid it
is possible to distinguish three periods: (a) the pre-
adjustment period characterized by an administered
economy, including administrative allocation of for-
eign exchange and accompanied by general foreign
exchange shortages; (b) the early adjustment period
aimed at stabilization of the economy; and (c) the later
adjustment period with an emphasis on a transition
toward a more market-oriented economy and further
adjustment of important macroeconomic variables.
The changing role of programme aid in these peri-
ods is discussed in White (1996a) and White
(1996b). Briefly: (a) in the early adjustment period,
programme aid aimed at supplying the foreign
exchange required for stabilization, largely under
the prevailing economic structure and institutions;
and (b) during the later adjustment, it was aimed
more at support for establishment of sustainable
market institutions, in particular for the markets for
foreign exchange and credit. The role of counter-
value funds in the government budget also became
more important (see Maxwell 1996).
The evaluation of the effectiveness of programme aid
must include criteria on how programme aid has con-
tributed toward stabilization, the establishment and
better functioning of market institutions, reducing the
importance of the parallel market and corruption, the
functioning of the revenue and expenditure system,
the custom system and the financial system.
Finally, one of the institutions that will have to be
reconsidered is aid itself, particularly in the form of pro-
gramme aid. Because of the rather long tradition of
large volumes of aid, the socioeconomic system adjusts
itself to the volume of aid: 'structural aid accommoda-
tion'. This fact has had consequences for the nature of
industrialization and agricultural development, the size
of the government sector, the nature of demand, and
the resulting prices of goods and services.
To a large extent this aid dependency through struc-
tural aid accommodation is also the responsibility of
the donors. Imbalances have persisted for many years.
Stabilization and adjustment processes are supposed
to deal with these imbalances. The irony and contra-
diction is that programme aid makes these adjust-
ment policies less urgent as it allows for imbalances to
persist. The extent of structural aid accommodation
should form an important part of the evaluation.
3.2 Programme Aid and Direct
Economic Effects
The direct macroeconomic effects of programme aid
should be studied as well. As elaborated in White
(1996), programme aid will affect the exchange rate,
the rate of growth, the budget deficit and exports.
These effects may be both positive (relief of forex
constraints) and negative (Dutch disease effects). An
evaluation methodology will have to include an
assessment of these effects and their operation.
The balance of these two conflicting tendencies will
determine the overall effect of programme aid, and
depend critically upon whether the economy is sup-
ply or demand constrained. Therefore, the first ques-
tion an evaluation of programme aid will have to
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pose is whether there is a supply constraint caused
by foreign exchange shortages. The second, related,
question is to which extent the appreciation caused
by the inflows of programme aid has contributed to
eliminating excess demand, if any, by negatively
affecting the demand for domestic production.
In relation to this point, an evaluation of the volume
and composition of investment, including export-
oriented investment, should be an important com-
ponent of evaluations concçrned with the direct
effects of programme aid. In addition to the possi-
ble appreciating effects of programme aid, SAPs
have influenced the size and nature of investments.
Particularly in most African countries, foreign invest-
ment is hardly forthcoming, private investment is in
trade related activities, privatization proceeds slowly
and few investors are interested, whereas export-ori-
ented investment is discouraged by Dutch disease
effects of aid. Thus the foreign gap is to a large extent
the excess of domestic consumption over domestic
income. The related foreign savings are to the same
extent used for the purpose of financing consump-
tion expenditure, of which only the incentive goods
may be argued to have a positive effect on local pro-
duction (although this argument had its strongest
claim during periods of great shortages).
In any case, foreign exchange shortages are a result
of market inefficiency or of missing markets. With
the creation of efficient foreign exchange markets, by
definition there will be no more shortage and the
direct argument for programme aid - for import sup-
port, not for debt relief - disappears. Put differently,
the institutional rationale for programme aid must
be that the market for foreign exchange still needs to
be established or is not (yet) efficient. When the
market is becoming more efficient, the volume of
programme aid can be gradually reduced.
3.3 Indirect Effects and Overall
Objectives of Dutch Aid
The objectives of programme aid under structural
adjustment should be understood as contributing to a
transition to market institutions. These contributions
can be both positive and negative. Positively, the new
market institutions for foreign exchange could not
have survived without sufficient donor support,
because of the structural imbalances in the economy
In a negative sense, by withholding aid tranches,
donors have induced governments to implement
structural adjustment reforms. Both the need for and
power of donor support are expressions of structural
aid dependency of recipient governments.
Given the support for structural adjustment policies
and the instrumental role of programme aid in
inducing governments to initiate adjustment poli-
cies, the Dutch government should evaluate the
extent to which the transition to a more market-
based system will contribute to its overall objectives
of aid. However, the relation of programme aid to
these objectives is at most indirect: the assumption
must be that in the long run a market-based system
can better provide goods and services than an
administered system. Specifically, the working
hypothesis should be that the objectives of alleviat-
ing poverty, enhancing women's emancipation, and
protecting the environment would be better attain-
able with growth that would be forthcoming under
the new policies.
However, a single policy instrument cannot be
expected to contribute to all objectives. More tar-
geted complementary measures would be required
to achieve the general policy objectives. Never-
theless, the assumption will have to be maintained
that the complementary instruments would be more
effective in a market-based economy. If this assump-
tion does not hold, a major effort will have to be ini-
tiated by the Dutch government to rethink the
internal consistency of its aid policies and priorities.
4 Joint Evaluation Missions
In the previous section it was argued that the institu-
tional changes to which programme aid may con-
tribute are not properly evaluated, if recognized at all.
At one platform however, the Joint Evaluation
Missions (JEMs), the institutional aspects have been
evaluated, albeit in a limited way and with an empha-
sis on matters of accounting and control procedures.
With unconditional programme aid, both direct
and indirect effects of programme aid cannot be
Sometimes the timing of the support of an individual
donor may have a certain effect, e.g. when despite
sufficient commitments the receiving government has
temporarily run out of foreign exchange. This, however,
is more often the exception than the rule.
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assessed for individual donors separately, since the
foreign exchange flows into a common pool and
cannot be traced.3 Thus, there is a strong case for
jointly evaluating programme aid. JEMs, initially at
least, concentrated on operational matters, rather
than on evaluating the effects of programme aid on
the creation of market institutions. Interestingly, by
pursuing these pragmatic questions, the JEMs have
come across issues and questions of great relevance
for the institutional evaluation of programme aid
under structural adjustment. However, these latter
issues have never been the explicit focus of these
missions. Attempts to elevate the discussions in the
JEMs to higher policy relevance by, amongst others,
the Dutch government have not been successful. lt
may be argued that the initial objectives and the
type of expertise available do not allow these wider
policy questions to be addressed by the JEMs.
The argument of this section is that JEM5 have evalu-
ated progress made in creating and adjusting market-
related institutions and problems experienced with
good governance, by scrutinizing the manner in which
new institutions handled the donor funds, including
counterpart funds. In addition, JEMs have contributed
to the operationalization of procedures and systems to
improve the working of these institutions. Though,
given their mandate and corresponding expertise they
could not deal systematically with these issues.
4.1 Objectives and 'Standard'
Issues
The initial objectives of the JEMs derived from the
objectives of the Special Programme of Assistance
(SPA) of African countries undertaking SAPs.4 Main
objectives of the SPA are to increase efficient use of
financial adjustment assistance, to accelerate dis-
bursements and to reduce the administrative burden
of recipient countries by untying assistance from
donors and harmonizing their procurement and dis-
bursement procedures. To foster these objectives,
donors participating in the SPA group decided in
1989 to undertake joint evaluations, in collaboration
with the recipient countries, to examine possibilities
for further harmonization of procedures. Participation
See also SPA Working Group on Import Support
(1992).
in JEMs was restricted to donor countries giving
import support and the major multilateral institu-
tions. Leadership was provided by the World Bank.
Criteria for programme aid were further influenced
by the principles on programme aid formulated by
the OECD Development Assistance Committee: (a)
wherever possible, policy-related programme aid
should be untied; (b) donors' procurement proce-
dures should be consistent with recipient countries'
trade and exchange rate reforms; (c) there should
be standardized international competitive bidding
(ICB) procedures and country-specific thresholds; a
system should be put in place for pre-shipment
inspection (PSI) of quality, quantity and price of
imports; and (d) there should be improved local
coordination between donors and recipient govern-
ments, including information sharing.
In this context, early JEMs emphasized the follow-
ing 'standard' issues: (a) procurement on the basis
of ICB for orders above a certain threshold (typi-
cally in the order of $US 1-2.5 mln); (b) procure-
ment procedures under the ICB threshold for both
public and private buyers; (c) PSI arrangements; (d)
disbursement procedures; and (e) donor coordina-
tion and harmonization of procedures. Both (a) and
(b) were to ensure value for money Later JEM5 have
gradually incorporated additional concerns.
4.2 Additional Concerns
JEMs took place to Ghana (1991), Kenya (1990),
Mozambique (1989, 1990, 1991, 1993), Tanzania
(1990, 1992, 1993, 1995), Uganda (1990, 1992,
1995), Zambia (1990) and Zimbabwe (1991). A11JEMs
summarized their findings in so-called aide memoires.
In the process of improving the operationalization of
programme aid, increasingly wider issues were discov-
ered in the rest of the system that were linked to the
operationalization of the support (see Table 1).
The interlinkages in the economic system implied
that even for the evaluation of the operational
aspects of programme aid various economic institu-
tions and government organizations would have to
be assessed. The methodology in these cases relied
on interviews and expert reports and cannot be said
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to be conclusive. This observation combined with
the level of detail of the recommendations, the rel-
ative lack of expertise of many participants on many
of the issues at stake, and the short duration of the
JEM5 (between one and two weeks) would lead to
the criticism that at least from an academic point of
view the conclusions reached by the JEM5 were not
always very sound. In addition, the methodology is
not explicitly discussed.5
Moreover, the JEM5 always assessed the operational
requirements of the institutions that are to deal with
the efficient processing of the support, but never
explicitly addressed the role of aid in creating and
sustaining these institutions.
4.3 JEMs and Evaluation Criteria
The argument of this section has been that although
originally instituted to evaluate the operational
aspects of programme aid, JEMs have assessed the
progress made in institution building for a market
economy and the effects of donor funds on the
working of these institutions. In addition, JEM5
have contributed to operationalization of proce-
dures and systems to improve the working of these
institutions.
The methodology of such evaluations has been to
review the detailed operations of the institutions
involved, including interviews with most of the par-
ticipants. While this has created much insight in the
actual problems of the various institutions in rela-
tion to their handling of aid flows, the effects of aid
on these institutions have not been explicitly evalu-
ated. Thus, from the experiences of JEMs no clear
methodology can be derived for establishing causal
relationships between the amounts of donor funds
disbursed and the evolution of the free market for
foreign exchange, and between the amount of coun-
terpart funds involved and the degree of slackness
on the revenue side including the mismanagement
of the customs system.
It remains therefore an untested hypothesis that
donor funds have made possible the development of
the free market for foreign exchange. The reasoning
that a withdrawal of donor funds from the foreign
One of the authors, Peter de Valk, participated in two
of the JEMs (Tanzania 1993, 1995), where he was able
to form judgements on the methodology followed.
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Table 1 Concerns of Joint Evaluation Missions in African Countries, 1990-95
Key concern
Foreign exchange
market
Reimbursement
system
Government revenue
(particularly JEMs
Tanzania 1995;
Uganda 1992, 1995)
Financial system
Capital market
Restructuring and
adjustment of manu-
facturing sector (in
later JEMs Tanzania
and Mozambique)
Establishment of
donor coordination
and monitoring
committees (JEMs
Mozambiquel 993
and Tanzania 1992,
1993, 1995)
Main aspects covered
Move from CtS to OGL with positive list), OGL (with negative list), forex
auctions and, finally, interbank system and concurrent unification of var-
ious exchange rates and closing gap official/parallel market rates of
crucial importance for mode of channeling donor funds; move implied
that donors no longer had information on how funds were spent
Development forex market and prevailing mismanagement of customs
system and tax authorities considerations of its introduction; ensured at
least a substantial volume of goods being imported according to official
procedures; but, illusory' control of donor funds; no guarantee of effi-
cient use of funds entering forex market; findings PSI agencies involved
in implementation of reimbursement system revealed extent of evasion
of taxes and duties
Recommendations on improving customs and revenue system; fungibil-
ity of donor funds is an important concern, particularly at the micro and
sectoral level; indirect displacement effects of aid as well if increased
availability of countervalue funds reduces revenue collection effort (unof-
ficially through corruption and mismanagement and/or officially through
reduced levels of tax or reduced efforts to increase the tax base)
Involvement of commercial banks in collection of counterpart funds and
later in interbank market has shifted concern to functioning of financial
system; financial restructuring implied delinking mostly government-
owned commercial banks from protection and subsidies of government;
effectiveness of programme aid in creating sustainable foreign
exchange markets also dependent on ability and efficiency of commer-
cial banks in processing paperwork involved in various transactions
(Particularly in JEM Tanzania 1995) initiative of the Central Bank to raise
capital from the public through open market operations by issuing
bonds; first start with capital market development can only be viable if
the open market financing requirements of the government remain
within certain limïts
Concern derived from fact that manufacturing sector in most countries:
(a) one of main beneficiaries of import support, (b) has high import
intensity, making it an important client of new foreign exchange
systems, (c) seriously affected by strLlctural adjustment policies and
needed further support in eyes of some donors: sector's problems
rooted in past protectionist policies coupled with fast liberalization that
did not allow much time for adjustment of productive efficiency; Dutch
disease effects of large aid inflows (increased competition from imports
and reduced potential to export): local producers disadvantaged by
lack of customs control that allowed vast quantities of imports to enter
domestic markets without paying appropriate duties and taxes
Improving implementation of the recommendations; JEM of Tanzania
(1995) even recommended the establishment of a joint management corn-
mittee consisting of donors and Tanzanian officials under the direction of
the World Bank; progress made with implementation of detailed recom-
mendations will form input in assessments for continuing programme aid
exchange markets would have led to a collapse of
these markets seems plausible but cannot be tested.
Similarly, the reasoning that vast amounts of counter-
part funds have led to slackness in the revenue efforts,
a collapse of proper customs procedures, tax evasion,
and corruption cannot be empirically corroborated.
5 Conclusions
The emphasis of recent Dutch evaluation studies is
on efficiency of aid delivery. Evaluation of direct
macro-effectiveness of programme aid has not taken
place. It is therefore impossible to speak of a method-
ology followed by the Dutch government in evalua-
tions of macro-effectiveness of programme aid.
With the introduction of Structural Adjustment
Programmes, the main objective of programme aid
became support for economic reforms or, more
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